

Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental

Jakub Mihálik - mihalik@flu.cas.cz

(The Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy/University of Hertfordshire)

The *Phenomenality and (Inner) Awareness* workshop, Prague, 11/11/2021

Brentano (1874, pp. 134-135):

[...] the consciousness of the presentation of the sound clearly occurs together with the consciousness of this consciousness, for the consciousness which accompanies the presentation of the sound is a consciousness not so much of this presentation as of the whole mental act in which the sound is presented, and in which the consciousness itself exists concomitantly.

- (1) The inner awareness that makes us aware of a mental state, thus making it conscious, is itself an object of inner awareness, hence conscious. (*Conscious-Inner-Awareness Thesis*)
- (2) Inner awareness itself occurs in our phenomenology. (*Phenomenal-Inner-Awareness Thesis*)
- (3) We are ordinarily unaware of our inner awareness of sensory states, hence this awareness is ordinarily non-conscious. (*Non-Conscious Inner-Awareness Thesis*)
- (4) Inner awareness is ordinarily phenomenologically absent from experience. (*No-Inner-Awareness-Phenomenology Thesis*)

J. Levine (2018, p. 119) against HOTT:

On this theory the higher-order state is not itself conscious. But this seems phenomenologically bizarre. The consciousness of the experience of seeing the ripe tomato seems as much a matter of which we are conscious as the ripe tomato itself. How can we say that the consciousness itself is not something we are aware of from within the first-person point of view?

S. Coleman (2017, p. 271) against 'awareness phenomenology':

In being aware of red, I just don't know what my alleged awareness of my awareness of red is meant to feel like; I find only the redness. When you ask me to attend to the relational property of my being aware of the redness, still all I find is the redness [...].

M. Montague (2017a, p. 378) on phenomenally present 'awareness of awareness' (AOA):

Brentano's idea here, which I endorse, is that AOA is not only an awareness of the awareness [presentation] of the sound, but of the entire conscious episode, which includes AOA itself. This self-revelatory nature of consciousness allows us to catch a glimpse of AOA [...].

P. F. Strawson's (2002, p. 98) on the distinction between perceivings and objects perceived:

[I]t seems to me as certain as anything can be that [...] we distinguish, naturally and unreflectively, between our seeings and hearings and feelings—our perceivings—of objects and the objects we see and hear and feel [...].

(5) it is impossible to become aware of our perceptual experience or its (intrinsic) features.

Montague's (2016) argument for conscious inner awareness (aka AOA):

(a) We naturally and unreflectively distinguish between our perceivings, and the things we perceive (*Strawson's Datum*).

(b) This fact is best explained by the fact that we are constitutively aware of our experience as what it is.

(c) We are constitutively aware of experience as what it is. (*conscious inner awareness*)

(6) Our outer (e.g. visual) awareness phenomenally contributes to phenomenology.

(7) Inner awareness is not phenomenally present, hence it is transparent.

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